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Politically Exposed on Saturday, August 26, 2006 12:33:45 AM
http://www.milmin.com/resources/leadership/georgemarshall.htm
George
C. Marshall
A
Leader of Leaders Marshalling
Jointness in America ’s Military
(The following
article was published in the Naval Institute Proceedings in September
1994. It discusses George C. Marshall's role in fostering
jointness between the Army, the Army Air Corps and the Navy during
World War II. Use it as a case study for effective leadership
among diverse groups with differing interests. See the emphasis
upon jointness as a metaphor for forging cooperation among churches,
ministries, or divisions within ministries.
George C. Marshall
exemplifies a leader who could keep the ultimate cause in focus
and who could lead above bureaucratic interests. Discuss
the following questions after reading the article:
What leadership
qualities does Marshall exhibit that apply to Christian leadership?
How did Marshall keep the national interest ahead of other parochial
interests? How does he illustrate ways of keeping the Kingdom of
God preeminent over denominational or individual ministry interests?
List ways in which you can be a better Kingdom leader based on Marshall's
example.)
President
Harry Truman said he was the “greatest living American,” that he
was “one for the ages.” Winston Churchill wondered if he was “the
greatest Roman of them all.” Others compared him to George Washington.
An American titan of war and of peace, General George Catlett Marshall
exemplified the qualities of the soldier-statesman.
The chronicle of his roles, occupied during critical times in U.S.
history—Army Chief of Staff (1939-45), Truman’s special emissary
to China (1945-47), Secretary of State (1947-49), and Secretary
of Defense during the Korean War (1950-51)—is reminiscent of the
ancient watchman who stationed himself atop the mortar and brick
of the defensive walls that protected his city. He was always alert
to danger, always prepared to sound a trumpet warning, and always
ready to join fellow warriors in closing the breaches in the wall.
When the United States needed such a man to stand on its wall or
to fight in the gaps, both in war and in peace, it turned to General
George Marshall.
As
Army Chief of Staff during World War II, Marshall modeled qualities
of leadership often forgotten, overlooked, or ignored in the training
of today’s officers. These leadership qualities, however, are essential
principles for joint leadership that future generations of U.S.
military leaders charged with forging and wielding the sword of
war cannot afford to ignore.
Joint
leaders recognize that interservice cooperation is a stepping stone
to interallied cooperation.
In
many ways, Marshall was the progenitor of jointness at the top.
Prior to and during World War II, when Army-Navy antagonisms
threatened
to infect every sinew of the defense bureaucracy, Marshall attacked
interservice competition head-on. By aggressively pursuing unity
of command, he reduced the bureaucratic drag of interservice
rivalry
that would have delayed victory and cost more American lives.
Unity
of command between the Army and the Navy, Marshall had noted, “will
add immeasurably to our security” and will serve as a “stepping
[stone] to larger decisions involved in our relationships with Allies.”
1 Recognizing that interservice jointness provided the framework
for interallied cooperation, Marshall hammered out agreeable relations
with allies at a time when mistrust easily might have prevailed.
In
discussions with the British after Pearl Harbor, Marshall helped
establish the Combined Chiefs of Staff. “Combined” referred to the
organizations fostering collaboration between nations. At the same
time, the British proposed and the United States accepted that the
term “joint” would be applied to collaboration among a single nation’s
organizations—a distinction already employed to describe the activities
and relations between the War and Navy Departments. To meet with
the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington, the Army and Navy chiefs
(Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King) and Army Air Corps Commander
Henry “Hap” Arnold joined with Admiral William D. Leahy to become
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Leahy, as President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s chief of staff, served as chairman. Yet it was Marshall
who bore the most responsibility for forging unity of command among
the services and across nations.
In
addition, it was General Marshall’s strategic concept—defeat Germany
first, hold in the Pacific—that was the foundation for Allied victory.
By his force of character, he convinced both President Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Churchill to adopt it. Marshall literally organized
the Allied victory. Churchill gave him due credit after the Nazi
defeat: “It has not fallen to your lot to command the great armies.
You have had to create them, organize them and inspire them. Under
your guiding hand, the might and valiant formations which have swept
across France and Germany were brought into being and perfected
in an amazingly short space of time.”
Joint
leaders must push jointness down the chain of command.
Marshall
had long recognized that “military victories are not gained by a
single arm.” Earlier in his career, he had forwarded plans for a
reorganization effort, particularly in joint purchasing. Despite
the cooperation of his coauthor, young Theodore Roosevelt (then
Acting Secretary of the Navy), the proposal got nowhere because,
as Marshall writes, “it did not have enough immediacy about it to
provide potent political argument.” Marshall ’s proposal also
included provisions for an exchange of officers from every section
of the General Staff of the War Department with their counterparts
in the Navy Department. He also suggested similar exchanges between
supply departments, medical departments, and ordnance and communication
services.
In
an effort to encourage jointness down the chain of command, Marshall
had noted that officers would serve in “positions which require
an intimate knowledge of the combined arms, and a breadth of vision
impossible to the man who devotes his entire interest to a single
arm.” Those exchanges, however, had to have meat to them; exchange
officers were not to be simply liaison officers.
Only
in this way, in my opinion, will the navy ever know intimately what,
why and how the army does things—and vice versa. I found both army
and navy officers—or officials, strongly opposed to such a measure.
And, I do not think they visualized the eventual good that I think
would come of such procedure. As a matter of fact, I seem to be
out of step with the rest of the world in this particular idea,
but to me it is fundamental, and the only effective leadup to the
proper coordination of the two services—don’t quote me.
The
immediacy of an approaching conflict in Europe and the Pacific forced
Marshall to forge concepts of jointness in other arenas, but, unfortunately,
delayed his efforts to push jointness down the chain of command.
Nevertheless, his insight is echoed in today’s requirements for
joint assignments.
Joint
leaders must keep the national interest in focus.
Parochial
interests wither before the aggressive promotion of national interests.
Marshall ’s superb relationship with President Roosevelt and the
Congress arose from the fact that they trusted him to pursue the
national interest. Marshall ’s professionalism, mastery of facts,
and obvious nonpartisanship often astounded and reassured congress-men.
“He would tell the truth even if it hurt his cause,” House Speaker
Sam Rayburn recalled.
For example, Marshall always cooperated with congressional investigating
committees and refused to challenge the “law requiring him to certify
goods as nonessential before sale to Britain though he believed
it unconstitutional.”
To
reinforce his nonpartisanship, Marshall consistently projected a
nonmilitarist and nonconfrontational image. Before Pearl Harbor,
Marshall and his staff often wore civilian clothes when requested to
appear before Congress. Civilian clothes, while calming domestic fears,
also represented the unity necessary to build the force needed for the
upcoming conflict.
Marshall
continually illustrated his statement that "an officer’s
ultimate commanding loyalty at all times is to his country, and
not to his service or to his superiors.” As a result of this
honest pursuit of national interest, he disarmed his opponents and
secured his influence within both political and military circles.
Joint
leaders must be “more than military men.”
After
the Bay of Pigs fiasco and during the Cuban Missile Crisis, President
John F. Kennedy argued that his military leaders were unable to
see beyond their immediate concerns. He wanted his service chiefs
to be more than narrow military specialists, to “look beyond the
limited military field.” Kennedy believed they must be “more than
military men.
This
may have been Marshall ’s greatest secret.
Though
a military officer until his late sixties, Marshall was what some
have called a “civilized warrior.” He expanded his focus beyond
the military. He constantly thought about how democracies make war
and peace. He saw the connection between economics and politics.
And he argued that such thinking should be the responsibility of
every officer in the Army.
He
challenged the officers of the Army Air Corps:
to
sit down sometime and try to balance all the factors concerned with
national defense. ... Divorce yourself for the moment from the Air
Corps and assume that the responsibility for the decisions regarding
national defense rests solely on your shoulders. .Seek to obtain
a clear picture of every aspect of national defense, so that you
may think straight and advise wisely.
Joint
leaders must be hedgehogs and not foxes.
The
Greek poet Archilochus noted that the “fox knows many things, but the
hedgehog knows one big thing.” British philosopher Isaiah Berlin, in an
essay entitled “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” offers insight into
Archilochus’s meaning: The hedgehog is a thinker or leader who “relates
everything to a single central vision. . . a single, universal,
organizing principle.” The fox, on the other hand, “pursues many ends,
often unrelated and even contradictory”.
George
Marshall, modeling the leadership of jointness, related everything
to the single central vision of victory. In war, a military leader
cannot be distracted from the pursuit of victory. In peace, a military
leader cannot be distracted from the preparations for victory. Personal
prestige and service loyalties must give way to the best plan for
success.
As
President Roosevelt considered supreme commanders for Operation
Overlord, he sought to give George Marshall his “place in history.”
Tempted to don the mantle of command, Marshall nevertheless passed
it on to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, his best field commander.
He recognized that leaving Washington might imperil the delicate
balance among the services and between the Allies. Too many foxes,
pursuing too many unrelated and contradictory ends, waited to distract
the United States from its singular pursuit of victory.
Joint
leaders must live outside themselves.
In
Homer’s Iliad, the gods ignited jealous disagreements between Achilles
and Achaean King Agamemnon over the spoils of war. Offended by
the affront to his prowess, position, and privilege, Achilles left
the
battle to sulk among the ships. Meanwhile, Hector of Troy ravaged
Achaean forces and would have thrown back the invasion had not
Achilles returned to his chariot. Many men died because Achilles
and Agamemnon
allowed jealousy to distract them and to divide their unified forces.
Joint leaders cannot listen to such temptations. Marshall almost
never did.
In
his dealings with Congress and subordinate commanders, Marshall
recognized that emotional outbursts had to give way to cold, factual
analysis. “Sentiment must submit to common sense.” Service loyalties
naturally produce emotional enthusiasms; joint leaders, however,
must model rational, nonpartisanship leadership.
Despite
their affiliation, joint leaders must learn to live outside of themselves.
They must separate from their feelings to focus on, as Marshall
said, the “straight business of the job.” Affective notions do not
lead to effective joint warfare.
To
Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, the Army Commander of Hawaii
who was placed under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz in an effort to achieve
unity of command, Marshall wrote, “These days are too perilous for
personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency.” Emmons should,
Marshall continued, “therefore be better prepared to assist me by
endeavoring to work with Nimitz in complete understanding.”
Joint
leaders must avoid “they-us” distinctions.
As
a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, President Roosevelt often
referred in meetings to the Army as “they” and to the Navy as “us.
In one meeting Marshall jokingly chided him for this language of
separateness and preference. Joint leaders, Marshall recognized,
cannot permit the language of separateness and preference to perpetuate
interservice competition.
A
leader’s choice of words helps define the interests, priorities,
and tenor of the organizations he leads. A vocabulary that
directs
its energies at other services rather than at the problem perpetuates
a “they-us” distinction that erodes jointness. Joint leaders
must speak the language of jointness.
Marshall
constantly sought to break down such distinctions of his commanders.
In a confidential memorandum for higher commanders, dated 11 September
1942, Marshall noted that indiscretions of officers in official
and unofficial conversations had produced serious consequences.
The higher commanders of the Army, “by their example and through
personal conversations with their principal subordinates, should
exert a sufficient influence to provide a remedy in these matters.”
The
indiscretions involved the continued language of separateness and
preference between the Army and the Navy, particularly in reference
to air actions in the Pacific.
Bad
blood is being stirred up between the Army and the Navy which is,
to put it mildly, a tragic misfortune. Again such action defeats
teamwork which is the vital essential of any joint operation. Short
tempers under the circumstances are inexcusable. Vigorous action
must be taken to suppress service jealousies and suspicions. It
is the clear duty of commissioned officers of the Army to do everything
in their power to promote harmonious relations and teamwork, avoiding
ill-advised comments and attitudes.
No
interservice division challenged General Marshall as much as that
evident in the Pacific theater. Led by Admiral King in Washington
and Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific, the Navy sought a Pacific-first
strategy contrary to Marshall ’s efforts to defeat Hitler in Europe
first. In addition, the Navy fought hard to command the entire Pacific
theater, thus running up against the Army under General Douglas
MacArthur in the South Pacific. Only Marshall ’s superior diplomatic
skill could smooth the conflict and keep the players focused on
the problem.
Mostly successful, Marshall recognized that the “they-us” mentality
could prevent U.S. forces from achieving victory under a joint and
combined forces concept.
Joint
leaders must build interservice ties through personal relationships.
General
Marshall’s efforts to build interservice ties through personal relationships
were critical to his success. At the beginning of the war, his friendship
with Admiral Harold Stark calmed the seething tension that existed
between the Army and Navy over resources, missions, and roles. His
close relationship with General Arnold of the Army Air Corps kept
the growing expression of a different service mission from distracting
them from their primary mission.
Even
with Admiral King—never his friend—Marshall realized that conflicts
could be depersonalized through an objective focus on facts
and
issues and by occasionally soothing the egos of service prima donnas.
When Admiral King stormed out of Marshall ’s office in anger
over treatment by an Army secretary, Marshall followed him
back to the
Navy Department, refusing to be bruised by King’s behavior.
Relationships
often form the glue that holds together jointness. Joint leaders
must be relationship-oriented, emphasizing long-term common interests
rather than immediate personal disagreements.
Conclusion
General
Marshall was in many ways the Cincinnatus of his age. As with the
Roman general, Marshall modeled selfless public service, an attitude
of sacrifice, and humble detachment from personal glory. In this
spirit of sacrifice and humility rests the secret of his ability
to overcome the barriers to jointness that existed within our military
forces. Before many of the structural reforms and reorganization
acts, George Catlett Marshall overcame interservice competition
through the quality of his leadership, a leadership that transformed
the services into a common sword wielded in singular pursuit of
victory.
The
primary source for Marshall ’s quotations is the edited collection
of his papers: Larry I. Bland. ed., The Papers of George Catlett
Marshall, vols. I, II. and Ill ( Baltimore and London : Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1981, 1986, 1991). Also Ed Cray, General of the
Army: George C. Mar shall, Soldier and Statesman ( New York : W.
W. Norton & Company, 1990); Leonard Mosley, Marshall :Hero
of Our Times ( New York : Hearst Books, 1982); Mark A. Stoler,
George
C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century ( Boston
: Twayne Publishers of G. K. Hall & Co., 1989); and, of course.
Forrest C. Pogue’s four-volume biography: George C. Marshall: Education
of a General, 1880-1939; Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942; Organizer of
Victory, 1943-1945; and Statesman, 1945-1959 ( New York : viking
Press, 1963-86).‘Staler, George C. Marshall, p. 77.‘John G. Kester,
‘The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” in John F. Reichart and
Steven R. Sturm, eds., American Defense Policy, 5th ed. ( Baltimore
: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1982).‘The notion of hedgehogs
and foxes is borrowed from James M. McPherson’s description of Abraham
Lincoln as a hedgehog in his book, Abraham Lincoln and the Second
American Revolution ( New York and Oxford : Oxford University Press,
1991). The citation for Berlin is Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and
the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History ( New York, 1966).
p. 1.